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Towards Optimal Effort Distribution in Process Design under
Uncertainty, with Application to Education
Olga Kosheleva1 and Vladik Kreinovich2

Departments of 1 Teacher Education and 2 Computer Science
University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX 79968, USA, olgak@utep.edu, vladik@utep.edu
Abstract. In most application areas, we need to take care of several (reasonably independent)
participants. For example, in controlling economics, we must make sure that all the economic
regions prosper. In controlling environment, we want to guarantee that all the geographic regions
have healthy environment. In education, we want to make sure that all the students learn all the
needed knowledge and skills.
In real life, the amount of resources is limited, so we face the problem of “optimally” distributing
these resources between different objects.
What is a reasonable way to formalize “optimally”? For each of the participants, preferences can
be described by utility functions: namely, an action is better if its expected utility is larger. It is
natural to require that the resulting group preference has the following property: if two actions has
the same quality for all participants, then they are equivalent for the group as well. It turns out
that under this requirement, the utility function of a group is a linear combination of individual
utility functions.
To solve the resulting optimization problem, we need to know, for each participant i, the utility
resulting from investing effort e in this participant. In practice, we only know this value with
(interval) uncertainty. So, for each distribution of efforts, instead of a single value of the group
utility, we only have an interval of possible values. To compare such intervals, we use Hurwicz
optimism-pessimism criterion well justified in decision making.
In the talk, we propose a solution to the resulting optimization problem.
Keywords: interval uncertainty, distribution of effort, optimization under uncertainty, Hurwicz
optimism-pessimism criterion

1. Formulation of the Problem
Need for effort distribution.
independent) participants.

In most application areas, we need to take care of several (reasonably

− For example, when we control economics, we must make sure that all the economic regions
prosper.
− When we control the environment, we want to guarantee that all the geographic regions have
healthy environment.
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− In education, we want to make sure that all the students learn all the needed knowledge and
skills.
In real life, the amount of resources is limited, so we face the problem of “optimally” distributing
these resources between different objects.
Example: education. In a typical class, we have students at different levels of knowledge, student
with different ability to learn the material. In the ideal world, we should devote unlimited individual
attention to all the students and make sure that everyone learns all the material. In real life, our
resources are finite. Based on this finite amount of resources, what is the best way to distribute
efforts between different students?
How do we compare different effort distributions? What is a reasonable way to formalize “optimally”? According to decision theory, for each of the objects, preferences can be described by utility
functions (see, e.g., (Luce and Raiffa, 1989)): namely, an action is better if the expected value of
its utility is larger.
It is therefore necessary to combine these utility functions into a single objective function that
characterizes the distribution of efforts. Such combination techniques will be discussed in this paper.
Uncertainty. In the ideal setting, we know, for each participant i, the utility resulting from investing effort e in this participant. In practice, we only know this value with (interval) uncertainty.
So, for each distribution of efforts, instead of a single value of the group utility, we only have an
interval of possible values.
We therefore need to be able to distribute efforts under such uncertainty. Methods of taking
uncertainty into account when distributing effort will also be discussed in this paper.
Example: education. In education, we usually do not have exact information about the cognitive
ability of each student, there is a large amount of uncertainty. We hope that our algorithms will be
useful in comparing and designing teaching strategies.
2. Traditional Approach to Solving the Resource Distribution Problem and Its
Limitations
How this problem is usually solved now: a brief description, on the example of the education problem.
The success of each individual student i can be naturally gauged by this student’s grade xi . So, for
two different effort distribution strategies T and T 0 , we know the corresponding grades x1 , . . . , xn
and x01 , . . . , x0n0 . Which strategy is better?
In some cases, the answer to this question is straightforward. For example, when n0 = n, xi ≤ x0i
for all i and xi < x0i for some i, then clearly the strategy T 0 is better.
In practice, however, the comparison is rarely that straightforward. Often, when we change a
strategy, some grades decrease while some other grades increase. In this case, how do we usually
decide whether a new method is better or not?
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In pedagogical research, the decision is usually made based on the comparison of the average
grades
def x1 + . . . + xn
E =
(1)
n
and
0
0
def x + . . . + xn0
E0 = 1
.
(2)
n0
For example, we can use the t-test (see, e.g., (Sheskin, 2007)) and conclude that the method T 0 is
better if the corresponding t-statistic
E0 − E
def
,
t = s
V
V0
+ 0
n
n
where

(3)

0

n
n
X
X
1
1
def
V =
·
(xi − E)2 , V 0 = 0
·
(x0 − E 0 )2 ,
n − 1 i=1
n − 1 i=1 i
def

(4)

exceeds the appropriate threshold tα (depending on the level of confidence α with which we want
to make this conclusion).
How this problem is usually solved now: limitations. The average grade is not always the most
adequate way to gauging the success of a pedagogical strategy. Whether the average grade is a
good criterion or not depends on our objective.
Let us illustrate this dependence on a simplified example. Suppose that after using the original
teaching method T , we get the grades x1 = 60 and x2 = 90. The average value of these grades is
E=

60 + 90
= 75.
2

(5)

Suppose that the new teaching method T 0 leads to the grades x01 = x02 = 70. The average of the
new grades is E 0 = 70.
Since the average grade decreases, the traditional conclusion would be that the new teaching
method T 0 is not as efficient as the original method T . However, one possible objective may be to
decrease the failing rate. Usually, 70 is the lowest grade corresponding to C, and any grade below
C is considered failing. In this case,
− in the original teaching method, one of the two students failed, while
− in the new teaching method, both students passed the class.
Thus, with respect to this objective, the new teaching method is better.
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3. Towards a More Adequate Solution to the Resource Distribution Problem: How
to Combine Utilities of Different Participants

Need to combine utility values: reminder. We can describe the consequence of each possible action
a for each participant i by his or her utility value ui (a). Thus, for n participants, each decision a
is characterized by n utility values u1 (a), . . . , un (a).
In order to compare different decisions a, we must combine these utility values ui (a) into a single
value of an objective function
u(a) = f (u1 (a), . . . , un (a)).
The meaning of this objective function is that the larger its value, the better the alternative a for
the group as a whole. Thus, we should select the alternative for which this combined value u(a) is
the largest.
Need to select a combination function. There are many different ways to combine the utility values.
In mathematical terms, this means that there are many different functions f (u1 , . . . , un ) that can
be used for such a combination. Which of these functions should we choose?
How to select a combination function: a reasonable requirement. Strictly speaking, utility theory
describes preferences of individuals. However, in practice, utility theory (and related game theory)
also describe interaction between groups. In such a description, we describe the preferences of each
group participant (corporation, city, country, etc.) by using the same utility theory approach: that
the preferences of a group can be described by a utility function in such a way that the preference
of an action is determined by the corresponding expected utilities.
It is therefore desirable to select a combination function for which the combined function has the
properties of the utility. In particular, it is natural to require that the resulting group preference
has the following property:
− if two actions has the same quality for all participants,
− then these two actions are equivalent for the group as well.
Towards formulating the above requirement in precise mathematical terms. Actions can lead to
different possible outcomes ω. We assume that for each possible outcome ω and for each participant
i, we know the utility ui (ω) that describes this participant’s opinion of this outcome.
The traditional decision theory describes situations in which we know the probability of different
possible outcomes. In other words, we assume that for every possible outcome ω and for every action
a, we know the probability p(ω | a) of this outcome.
According to utility theory, the utility of an action a for a participant i is determined by the
expected value of this participant’s utility, i.e., by the value
ui (a) = E[ui | a] =

X

p(ω | a) · ui (ω).

ω
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For example, to the participant i, the action a is equivalent to the outcome ω0 in which ui (ω0 ) =
E[ui ].
For each outcome ω, the utility of the i-th participant is ui (ω) and thus, the group utility is
equal to
u(ω) = f (u1 (ω), . . . , un (ω)).
Thus, the utility u of the action a for the group should be equal to the expected value of the group
utility:
X
u(a) = E[u | a] =
p(ω | a) · u(ω),
ω

i.e., to
u(a) = E[f (u1 , . . . , un ) | a] =

X

p(ω | a) · f (u1 (ω), . . . , un (ω)).

ω

On the other hand, for each participant i, the action a is simply equivalent to an alternative
with utility E[ui ]. So, a situation in which each participant gets a reward of utility E[ui ] (with
probability 1) is, for each participant, equivalent to the action a. Our requirement states that this
situation should be equivalent to the action a for the group as well.
For this equivalent situation, its group utility us can be found by applying the same combination
function f (u1 , . . . , un ) to the deterministic utility values ui = E[ui ]:
us (a) = f (E[u1 ], . . . , E[un ]).
Since the action a and the new situation are equivalent for the group, their group utilities must
coincide. So, we must have
E[f (u1 , . . . , un )] = f (E[u1 ], . . . , E[un ])

(6)

for every n random variables u1 , . . . , un .
Resulting mathematical formulation. We are looking for functions f (u1 , . . . , un ) for which, for all
possible n random variables ui , we have
E[f (u1 , . . . , un )] = f (E[u1 ], . . . , E[un ]).
Our result.
functions

We will show that the only functions which satisfy the above property are the linear
f (u1 , . . . , un ) = w0 +

n
X

wi · ui

i=1

for appropriate weights w0 , w1 , . . . , wn .
Proof. For a linear function f , the property (6) is easy to derive. Indeed, due to the properties of
expected value, we have
"

E[f (u1 , . . . , un )] = E w0 +

n
X
i=1

#

wi · ui = w0 +

n
X

wi · E[ui ] = f (E[u1 ], . . . , E[un ]).

i=1
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Vice versa, let us assume that the function f (u1 , . . . , un ) satisfies the property (6). For simplicity,
let us restrict ourselves to the case n = 2; the case n > 2 can be handled similarly. Let us show
that in the case n = 2, the function is indeed linear.
Indeed, without loss of generality, let us consider values u1 ∈ [0, 1] and u2 ∈ [0, 1] for which
u1 ≥ u2 . Let us consider the situation with three possible outcomes:
− an outcome ω1 whose probability is p(ω1 ) = u2 ;
− an outcome ω2 whose probability is p(ω2 ) = u1 − u2 ; and
− an outcome ω1 whose probability is p(ω3 ) = 1 − u1 .
One can easily see that
p(ω1 ) + p(ω2 ) + p(ω3 ) = 1.
We then select the individual utility functions as follows:
− we take u1 (ω1 ) = 1 and u2 (ω1 ) = 1;
− we take u1 (ω2 ) = 1 and u2 (ω2 ) = 0; and
− we take u1 (ω3 ) = 0 and u2 (ω3 ) = 0.
In this case, the expected values of individual participants are equal to:
E[u1 ] = p(ω1 ) · u1 (ω1 ) + p(ω2 ) · u1 (ω2 ) + p(ω3 ) · u1 (ω3 ) = u2 · 1 + (u1 − u2 ) · 1 + (1 − u1 ) · 0 = u1
and
E[u2 ] = p(ω1 ) · u2 (ω1 ) + p(ω2 ) · u2 (ω2 ) + p(ω3 ) · u2 (ω3 ) = u2 · 1 + (u1 − u2 ) · 0 + (1 − u1 ) · 0 = u2 .
In this situation, the group utility u(ω) = f (u1 (ω), u2 (ω)) is equal to:
− for the outcome ω1 , to u(ω1 ) = f (u1 (ω1 ), u2 (ω1 )) = f (1, 1);
− for the outcome ω2 , to u(ω2 ) = f (u1 (ω2 ), u2 (ω2 )) = f (1, 0);
− for the outcome ω3 , to u(ω3 ) = f (u1 (ω3 ), u2 (ω3 )) = f (0, 0).
Thus, the expected values of the group utility is equal to:
E[u] = p(ω1 ) · u(ω1 ) + p(ω2 ) · u(ω2 ) + p(ω3 ) · u(ω3 ) = u2 · f (1, 1) + (u1 − u2 ) · f (1, 0) + (1 − u1 ) · f (0, 0).
On the other hand, due to the property (6), this expected value should be equal to
f (E[u1 ], E[u2 ]) = f (u1 , u2 ). Thus, we conclude that
f (u1 , u2 ) = u2 · f (1, 1) + (u1 − u2 ) · f (1, 0) + (1 − u1 ) · f (0, 0).

(7)

So, for u1 ≥ u2 , the function f (u1 , u2 ) can indeed be described by an expression which is linear in
u1 and u2 .
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In particular, for u1 = u2 = 0.5, we conclude that
f (0.5, 0.5) = 0.5 · f (1, 1) + 0.5 · f (0, 0).

(8)

Similarly, we can prove that another linear expression describes the function f (u1 , u2 ) for the
case when u1 ≤ u2 :
f (u1 , u2 ) = u1 · f (1, 1) + (u2 − u1 ) · f (0, 1) + (1 − u2 ) · f (0, 0).

(9)

To complete our proof, we must show that these two linear expressions coincide, i.e., that the same
linear expression is applicable both:
− in the case of u1 ≥ u2 and
− in the case of u2 ≥ u1 .
For that, let us consider a new situation with two possible outcomes:
− an outcome ω1 whose probability is p(ω1 ) = 0.5, and
− an outcome ω2 whose probability is p(ω2 ) = 0.5.
We then select the individual utility functions as follows:
− we take u1 (ω1 ) = 1 and u2 (ω1 ) = 0, and
− we take u1 (ω2 ) = 0 and u2 (ω2 ) = 1.
In this case, the expected values of individual participants are equal to:
E[u1 ] = p(ω1 ) · u1 (ω1 ) + p(ω2 ) · u1 (ω2 ) = 0.5 · 1 + 0.5 · 0 = 0.5
and
E[u2 ] = p(ω1 ) · u2 (ω1 ) + p(ω2 ) · u2 (ω2 ) = 0.5 · 0 + 0.5 · 1 = 0.5.
In this situation, the group utility u(ω) = f (u1 (ω), u2 (ω)) is equal to:
− for the outcome ω1 , to u(ω1 ) = f (u1 (ω1 ), u2 (ω1 )) = f (1, 0), and
− for the outcome ω2 , to u(ω2 ) = f (u1 (ω2 ), u2 (ω2 )) = f (0, 1).
Thus, the expected values of the group utility is equal to:
E[u] = p(ω1 ) · u(ω1 ) + p(ω2 ) · u(ω2 ) = 0.5 · f (1, 0) + 0.5 · f (0, 1).
On the other hand, due to the property (6), this expected value should be equal to
f (E[u1 ], E[u2 ]) = f (0.5, 0.5).
Thus, we conclude that
f (0.5, 0.5) = 0.5 · f (1, 0) + 0.5 · f (0, 1).

(10)
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By comparing (10) and (8), we conclude that
0.5 · f (1, 1) + 0.5 · f (0, 0) = 0.5 · f (1, 0) + 0.5 · f (0, 1),

(11)

f (1, 1) + f (0, 0) = f (1, 0) + f (0, 1),

(12)

f (1, 0) = f (1, 1) + f (0, 0) − f (0, 1).

(13)

hence
and, thus,
Substituting the expression (13) into the formula (7), we get the expression (9). Thus, the two
linear formulas (7) and (9) are indeed identical.
The statement is proven.
Comment. This result is similar to the result about the case when the participants are, in some
reasonable sense, independent. This case has been actively analyzed in decision theory. In particular,
it has been proven that the corresponding objective function can be represented as the sum of
“marginal” objective functions representing different participants, i.e.,
f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = f1 (x1 ) + . . . + fn (xn );

(14)

see, e.g., (Fishburn, 1969; Fishburn, 1988).

4. Towards the Optimal Effort Distribution: Constraint Optimization Problem

Formulation of the problem. Let ei (xi ) denote the amount of effort (time, etc.) that is need for
i-th participant to achieve the value xi of the corresponding quantity (grade, income, etc.). It is
reasonable to assume that the better effect we want to achieve, the more effort we need, so each
function ei (xi ) is strictly increasing.
Let ui (xi ) denote the utility of the i-th participant on achieving the value xi , and let wi denote
the corresponding weight.
Let e denote the available amount of effort. In these terms, the problem of selecting the optimal
teaching strategy means that we maximize the objective function under the constraint that the
overall effort cannot exceed e:
Maximize f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = w0 + w1 · u1 (x1 ) + . . . wn · un (xn )

(15)

under the constraint
e1 (x1 ) + . . . + en (xn ) ≤ e.

(16)
def

Comment. The objective function (15) depends only on the combinations fi (x) = wi · ui (x) and
not on the individual values of wi and ui (x). Thus, to simplify the corresponding optimization
problem, it makes sense to reformulate it in terms of the new “benefit” functions fi (x).
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Similarly, the constant value w0 is irrelevant for optimization, so we can safely ignore it. Thus,
we arrive at the following simplified formulation:
Maximize f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = f1 (x1 ) + . . . + fn (xn )

(17)

under the constraint (16).
Towards solution. First we note that, due to monotonicity, if the total effort is smaller than e, then
we can spend more effort and get the better value of the objective function (17). In other words,
the maximum is attained when all the effort is actually used, i.e., when we have the constraint
e1 (x1 ) + . . . + en (xn ) = e.

(18)

To maximize the objective function (17) under this constraint, we can use the Lagrange multiplier
method. According to this method, the maximum of the function (17) under constraint (18) is
attained when for some value λ, the auxiliary function
f1 (x1 ) + . . . + fn (xn ) + λ · (e1 (x1 ) + . . . + en (xn ))

(19)

attains its (unconstrained) maximum. Differentiating this auxiliary function with respect to xi and
equating the derivatives to 0, we conclude that
fi0 (xi ) + λ · e0i (xi ) = 0,

(20)

where fi0 and e0i denote the derivatives of the corresponding functions. From this formula, we can
explicitly describe λ as
f 0 (xi )
= λ.
(21)
− i0
ei (xi )
So, once we know λ, we can find all the corresponding grades xi – and the resulting efforts – by
solving, for each i, a (non-linear) equation (21) with a single variable xi .
The value λ can be found from the formula (18), i.e., from the condition that for the resulting
values xi , we get

n
P

i=1

ei (xi ) = e.

5. Need to Take Uncertainty Into Account

Assumptions: reminder.

In the above text, we assumed that:

− we know exactly the benefits f (x1 , . . . , xn ) of participants achieving the levels x1 , . . . , xn ; for
example, we know the exact expressions for the benefit functions fi (xi );
− we know exactly how much effort ei (xi ) is needed to bring each participant i to a given level
xi , and
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− we know exactly the level of xi of each participant – for example, in education, the level of
knowledge xi is exactly determined by the grade.
In practice, we have uncertainty.
Average benefit function. First, we rarely know the exact benefit function fi (xi ) characterizing
each individual participant. At best, we know the average function a(x) describing the average
benefits of the level x to a participant.
Average effort function. Second, we rarely know the exact effort function ei (xi ) characterizing
each individual participant. At best, we know the average function e(x) describing the average
effort needed to bring a participant to the level x.
ei is only an approximate indication of the particInterval uncertainty. Finally, the known value x
e
ei .
ipant’s level xi . Once we know the estimate xi , we cannot conclude that the level xi is exactly x
At best, we know the accuracy εi of this estimate. In this case, the actual (unknown) level xi can
def
ei − εi , x
ei + εi ].
take any value from the interval xi = [xi , xi ] = [x
Under interval uncertainty, instead of a single value of the objective function f (x1 , . . . , xn ), we
get an interval of possible values
def

[f , f ] = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = {f (x1 , . . . , xn ) | x1 ∈ x1 , . . . , xn ∈ xn }.

(22)

ei come from experts. Experts often
Fuzzy uncertainty. In many practical situations, the estimates x
describe the inaccuracy of their estimates in terms of imprecise words from natural language, such
as “approximately 0.1”, etc. A natural way to formalize such words is to use special techniques
developed for formalizing this type of estimates – specifically, the technique of fuzzy logic; see, e.g.,
(Klir and Yuan, 1995; Nguyen and Walker, 2005).
In this technique, for each possible value of xi ∈ [xi , xi ], we describe the degree µi (xi ) to which
this value is possible. For each degree of certainty α, we can determine the set of values of xi that
are possible with at least this degree of certainty – the α-cut xi (α) = {x | µi (x) ≥ α} of the original
fuzzy set. Vice versa, if we know α-cuts for every α, then, for each object x, we can determine the
degree of possibility that x belongs to the original fuzzy set (Dubois and Prade, 1978; Klir and
Yuan, 1995; Moore and Lodwick, 2003; Nguyen and Kreinovich, 1996; Nguyen and Walker, 2005).
A fuzzy set can be thus viewed as a nested family of its (interval) α-cuts.

From the computational viewpoint, fuzzy uncertainty can be reduced to the interval one. Once
we know how to propagate interval uncertainty, then, to propagate the fuzzy uncertainty, we can
consider, for each α, the fuzzy set y with the α-cuts
y(α) = f (x1 (α), . . . , x1 (α));

(23)

see, e.g., (Dubois and Prade, 1978; Klir and Yuan, 1995; Moore and Lodwick, 2003; Nguyen and
Kreinovich, 1996; Nguyen and Walker, 2005). So, from the computational viewpoint, the problem
of propagating fuzzy uncertainty can be reduced to several interval propagation problems.
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Because of this reduction, in the following text, we will mainly concentrate on algorithms for
the interval case.
6. How to Take Uncertainty Into Account
Let us analyze how we can take into account these different types of uncertainties.
Average utility function: general situation. Let us first consider the case when instead of the
individual benefit functions f1 (x1 ), . . . , fn (xn ), we only know the average function a(x). In this
case, for a combination of levels x1 , . . . , xn , the resulting value of the objective function is
f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = a(x1 ) + . . . + a(xn ).

(24)

Smooth utility functions. Usually, the utility function is reasonably smooth. In this case, if
(hopefully) all the levels are close, we can expand the function a(x) in Taylor series around the
average level, and keep only quadratic terms in this expansion. The general form of this quadratic
approximation is
a(x) = a0 + a1 · x + a2 · x2 ,
(25)
for some coefficients a0 , a1 , and a2 . For this function, the expression (24) for the objective function
takes the form
n
n
f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = n · a0 + a1 ·

X
i=1

xi + a2 ·

X

x2i ,

(26)

i=1

i.e., the form
f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = b0 + b1 · E + b2 · M,
def

def

(27)

def

where b0 = n · a0 , b1 = n · a1 , b2 = n · a2 , E is the average (1), and M is the second sample
moment:
n
def 1 X 2
x .
(28)
M = ·
n i=1 i
Thus, for smooth benefit functions a(x), to estimate the utility corresponding to a given combination
of levels x1 , . . . , xn , it is not necessary to know all these n levels, it is sufficient to know the average
level and the mean squared level (or, equivalently, the standard deviation of the levels).
Comment. In general, the benefit function a(x) is increasing with xi . However, it is worth mentioning that the above conclusion holds for every quadratic function a(x), not necessarily a function
which is increasing for all the values x1 , . . . , xn .
Case of interval uncertainty. Until now, we assumed that we know the exact values x1 , . . . , xn
of the participants’ levels. What will happen if instead, we only know intervals [xi , xi ] of possible
values of xi ?
Since the benefit function a(x) is increasing (the higher levels the better),
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− the largest possible value f of the objective function f (x1 , . . . , xn ) is attained when the values
xi are the largest possible xi = xi , and
− the smallest possible value f of the objective function is attained when the values xi are the
smallest possible xi = xi .
In other words, we get the following interval [f , f ] of possible values f (x1 , . . . , xn ) of the objective
function:
" n
#
n
[f , f ] =

X
i=1

a(xi ),

X

a(xi ) .

(29)

i=1

Comment. We mentioned that for the case of smooth (quadratic) utility function and exactly
known xi , we do not need to keep all n levels – it is sufficient to keep only the first and second
sample moments of these grades. A natural question is: in the case of interval uncertainty, do we
need to keep n intervals, or can we use a few numbers instead? In the Appendix, we show that
under interval uncertainty, in the general case, all n values are needed.
How to solve the corresponding optimization problem. To solve the resulting optimization problem,
we need to know, for each participant i, the utility resulting from investing effort e in this participant. In practice, we only know this value with (interval) uncertainty. So, for each distribution of
efforts, instead of a single value of the group utility, we only have an interval of possible values.
To compare such intervals, we can use Hurwicz optimism-pessimism criterion well justified in
decision making (Hurwicz, 1951; Luce and Raiffa, 1989): namely, we select a value αopt ∈ [0, 1]
describing our degree of optimism, and use the value αopt · f + (1 − αopt ) · f as the objective
function.
7. Beyond Utility-Motivated Linear Combination: On the Example of Teaching
Alternative combination rules are sometimes used. In the above text, we considered utilitymotivated linear combinations of utility functions. In practice, other combination rules f (x1 , . . . , xn )
are also used. Let us give education-related examples of such rules.
Minimizing failure rate. The objective of minimizing the failure rate means that we minimize the
number of students whose grade is below the passing threshold x0 :
f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = #{i : xi < x0 }.

(30)

Comment. Since the general objective is to maximize the value of the objective function
f (x1 , . . . , xn ), we can reformulate the criterion (30) as a maximization one: namely, minimizing
(30) is equivalent to maximize the number of students whose grade is above (or equal to) the
passing threshold x0 :
f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = #{i : xi ≥ x0 }.
(31)
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No Child Left Behind. Other criteria are also possible. For example, the idea that no child should
be left behind means, in effect, that we gauge the quality of a school by the performance of the
worst student – i.e., of the student with the lowest grade min(x1 , . . . , xn ). Thus, the corresponding
objective is to maximize this lowest grade:
f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = min(x1 , . . . , xn ).

(32)

Explicit solution to the optimization problem: “No Child Left Behind” case. In the No Child Left
Behind case, we maximize the lowest grade. For this objective function, there is also an explicit
solution. Since our objective is to maximize the lowest grade, there is no sense to use the effort
to get one of the student grades better than the lowest grade – because the lowest grade will not
change. From the viewpoint of the objective function, it is more beneficial to use the same efforts
to increase the grades of all the students at the same time – this will increase the lowest grade.
In this case, the common grade xc that we can achieve can be determined from the condition
(18), i.e., from the equation
e1 (xc ) + . . . + en (xc ) = e.
(33)
Comment. A slightly more complex situation occurs when we start not at the beginning, but at
the intermediate situation when some students already have some knowledge. Let us denote the
(0)
starting grades by xi . Without losing generality, let us assume that the students are sorted in
(0)
(0)
the increasing order of their grades, i.e., that x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xn . In this case, the optimal effort
distribution aimed at maximizing the lowest grade is as follows:
(0)

− first, all the efforts must go into increasing the original grade x1 of the worst student to the
(0)
next level x2 ;
− if this attempt to increase consumes all available effort, then this is what we got;
− otherwise, if some effort is left, we raise the grades of the two lowest-graded students x1 and
(0)
x2 to the yet next level x3 , etc.
In precise terms, the resulting optimal distribution of efforts can be described as follows. First, we
find the largest value k for which all the grades x1 , . . . , xk can be raised to the k-th original level
(0)
xk . In precise terms, this means the largest value k for which
(0

(0)

e1 (xk ) + . . . + ek (xk ) ≤ e.

(34)
(0)

This means that for the criterion min(x1 , . . . , xn ), we can achieve the value xk , but we cannot
(0)
achieve the value xk+1 .
(0)

(0)

Then, we find the value x ∈ [xk , xk+1 ) for which
e1 (x) + . . . + ek−1 (x) + ek (x) = e.

(35)
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This value x is the optimal value of the criterion min(x1 , . . . , xn ).
Maximizing success rate. The quality of a high school is often gauged by the number of alumni
who get into prestigious schools. In terms of the grades xi , this means, crudely speaking, that we
maximize the number of students whose grade exceeds the minimal entrance grade e0 for prestigious
schools:
f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = #{i : xi ≥ e0 }.
(36)
From the mathematical viewpoint, this criterion is equivalent to minimizing the number of
students whose grade is below e0 – and is, thus, equivalent to criterion (30), with x0 = e0 ,
Best school to get in. There is a version of the above criterion which is not equivalent to (30), when
the quality of a high school is gauged by the success of the best alumnus: e.g., “one of our alumni
got into Harvard”. In terms of the grades xi , this means, crudely speaking, that we maximize the
highest of the grades max(x1 , . . . , xn ), i.e., that we take
f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = max(x1 , . . . , xn ).

(37)

Explicit solution to the optimization problem: “Best School to Get In” case. If the criterion is the
Best School to Get In, i.e., in terms of grades, the largest possible grade xi , then the optimal use
of effort is, of course, to concentrate on a single individual and ignore the rest. Which individual
to target depends on how much gain we will get. In other words,
− first, for each i, we find xi for which ei (xi ) = e, and then
− we choose the student with the largest value of xi as a recipient of all the efforts.
Criteria combining mean and variance. Another possible approach comes from the fact that the
traditional criterion– that only takes into account the average (mean) grade E is not always adequate. The reason for inadequacy is that the mean does not provide us any information about the
“spread” of the grades, i.e., the information about how much the grades deviate from the mean.
This information is provided by the standard deviation σ, or, equivalently, the sample variance
V = σ 2 . Thus, we arrive at criteria of the type f (E, V ).
When the mean is fixed, usually, we aim for the smallest possible variation – unless we gauge
a school by its best students. Similarly, when the variance is fixed, we aim for the largest possible
mean.
Thus, it is reasonable to require that the objective function f (E, V ) is an increasing function of
E and a decreasing function of V .
Estimating f (E, V ) under interval uncertainty. Let us consider the case when the objective function has the form f (E, V ), where f (E, V ) increases as a function of E and decreases as a function
of V . How can we estimate the range [f , f ] of the values of this objective function under interval
uncertainty xi ∈ [xi , xi ]?
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In general, this range estimation problem is NP-hard already for the case f (E, V ) = −V ; see,
e.g., (Kreinovich et al., 2006). This means, crudely speaking, that unless P=NP (and most computer
scientists believe that P6=NP), no efficient (polynomial time) algorithm can always compute the
exact range.
The maximum of the expression f (E, V ) can be found efficiently. For that, it is sufficient to
consider all 2n + 2 intervals [r, r] into which the values xi and xi divide the real line, and for each
of these intervals, and for each r ∈ [r, r], take the values
• xi = xi when xi ≤ r;
• xi = r when [r, r] ⊆ [xi , xi ]; and
• xi = xi when r ≤ xi .
(The proof is similar to the ones given in (Kreinovich et al., 2006).)
For the minimum of f (E, V ), for reasonable cases, efficient algorithms are also possible. One
such case is when none of the intervals [xi , xi ] is a proper subset of another one, i.e., to be more
precise, when xi , xi 6⊆ (xj , xj ).
In this case, a proof similar to the one from (Kreinovich et al., 2006) shows that if we sort the
intervals in lexicographic order
[x1 , x1 ] ≤ [x2 , x2 ] ≤ . . . ≤ [xn , xn ],

(38)

[a, b] ≤ [b, b] ↔ a < b ∨ (a = b & a ≤ b),

(39)

where
then the minimum of f is attained at one of the combinations
(x1 , . . . , xk−1 , xk , xk+1 , . . . , xn )

(40)

for some xk ∈ [xk , xk ]. Thus, to find the minimum, it is sufficient to sort the values, and then find
the smallest possible value of f (E, V ) for each of n + 1 such combinations.
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Appendix
A. Interval Uncertainty, Smooth Benefit Function: Analysis

Informal description of our result. In the main text, we mentioned that for the case of smooth
(quadratic) utility function a(x) and exactly known xi , we do not need to keep all n levels, it is
sufficient to keep only the first and second sample moments of these levels. Let us show that for
interval uncertainty, all n bounds are needed.
Specifically, we will prove the following.
ei −εi , x
ei +εi ]. We will consider
Precise formulation of the result. Suppose that we have n intervals [x
ei are different.
a non-degenerate case when all the grades x
Let us assume that for every quadratic function a(x), we know the range [f , f ] of the function
e i − εi , x
ei + εi ]. Then, based on the ranges corresponding to
a(x1 ) + . . . + a(xn ) over the intervals [x
different quadratic functions a(x), we can uniquely reconstruct the original collection of intervals.
In other words, if two different non-degenerate collections of intervals lead to exact same ranges
for every quadratic function, then these collections coincide – i.e., they differ only by permutations.

Comment. It is not known whether the same is true if we allow arbitrary – not necessarily nondegenerate – collections of intervals.
Proof.

For every quadratic function a(x), the largest possible value f of the sum

n
P
i=1

a(xi ) is

attained when each of the terms u(xi ) is the largest possible, and is equal to the sum of the
corresponding n largest values:
f = f 1 + . . . + f n.
(41)
For every real number α, the quadratic function a(x) = (x − α)2 attains its largest value on the
ei − εi , x
ei + εi ] at one of the endpoints x
ei − εi or x
ei + εi . One can easily check that:
interval [x
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ei , then the largest possible value f i of a(x) on the interval [x
e i − εi , x
ei + εi ] is
− when α ≤ x
2
e
attained when xi = xi = xi + εi and is equal to f i = (xi − α) ;
ei , then the largest possible value f i of a(x) on the interval [x
e i − εi , x
ei + εi ] is
− when α ≥ x
ei − εi and is equal to f i = (xi − α)2 .
attained when xi = xi = x

Let us use this fact to describe the dependence of f on the parameter α.
ei , the value f is the sum of n smooth expressions.
When α 6= x
At each point α = xi , all the terms f j in the sum f are smooth except for the term f i that
turns from (xi − α)2 to (xi − α)2 . The derivative of f i with respect to α changes from 2 · (α − xi )
to 2 · (α − xi ), i.e., increases by
2 · (α − xi ) − 2 · (α − xi ) = 2 · (xi − xi ) = 4 · εi .

(42)

ei , at α = x
ei , the derivative of the sum
Since all the other components f j are smooth at α = x
f (α) also increases by 4εi .
Thus, once we know the value f for all α,
ei as the values at which the derivative is discontinuous; and
− we can find the values x
ei .
− we can find each value εi as 1/4 of the increase of the derivative at the corresponding point x

The statement is proven.
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